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Abstract The policy literature has long recognized the inherent need for a program to fit the
unique conditions found in a certain context. We present a theory of institutional contextu-
alism that focuses on the mechanisms by which actors adapt a policy design to fit a situation.
We conceptualize institutions as phenomena that are constituted by a constant dialectic
between text (the general blueprint) and context (the particular setting). The first half of this
dialectic, which is the diffusion of the constitutive text or norm onto the institutional setting,
has been discussed in the literature. Our research focuses on the second half, and we delineate,
in concept, mechanisms for fitting the program to the local context. We then use a case study
of improvised microfinance programs in Tamil Nadu, India, to illustrate how this occurs in
reality. The research underscores the unexamined link between effective governance and
contextual fit and offers a typology of mechanisms for fit that should inform future research.
Keywords Contextualism  Institutional design  Program evaluation  Policy
implementation  Policy transfer
Introduction
In an address to APPAM,1 Eugene Bardach underscored the need to understand why policy
actors do not simply import a program for implementation but, instead, adapt and cus-
tomize it for their own uses (Bardach 2004). In the policy design literature, Michael
Howlett discusses a related notion of calibration or fine-tuning of policy instruments,
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which invariably takes place if there is to be a congruence between goals and means
(Howlett 2009). But, again to cite Bardach, the toolkit of the policy analyst lacks the
conceptual framework to make sense of this kind of adaptation (2004). In this article, we
focus more closely on delineating and describing the mechanisms behind these processes
of adaptation which, we believe, should help us make sense of these processes and
understand why they are necessary for a program to thrive.
Our focus on fit responds to another issue identified in recent literature, where there has
been a resurgence of critiques of so-called institutional blueprints (Berkes 2007; Ostrom
2008). These blueprints are institutional models that, once conceived, are then applied
wholesale to a host of diverse contexts. The problem is that these institutional designs may
not exactly match the particular needs of places and communities and, so, not function
optimally. For example, Rapley describes how structural adjustment packages, touted by
institutions like the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s, were a common recipe
which were simply imposed upon a wide range of developing country situations. He notes
how it was inevitable that this unitary institutional design should have widely divergent
outcomes in different countries (Rapley 1996). Quite simply, these recondite program
designs fail to match the complexity and diversity of real-world contexts.
Our response is a return to contextuality. If institutions are to endure, they must somehow
fit their context, which begs the question of how to conceptualize ‘‘fit’’. We use the term,
institution, to refer to repeated, habitualized patterns of activity in the public sphere, with a
specific focus on the delivery of goods and services. Oftentimes, we will use the term,
program, as synonymous with institution. This article conducts a systematic analysis of what
‘‘making fit’’ means. This leads to a more explicit description of mechanisms of institutional
fit, which is depicted as emerging from an interplay between text (the constitutive blueprint)
and context (the specific setting). As will be discussed, extant conceptualizations of fit, such as
from contingency theory (Chandler 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Pugh 1990; Donaldson
1996, 2001) have not sufficiently described key aspects of fit that are take up herein.
We illustrate this closer focus upon fit by employing these concepts in the case study of
microfinance, a policy area characterized by a diversity of local program designs. The
attempt is not to be exhaustive but to richly describe the factors and interactions that have
contributed to institutional fit in the context of microfinance. This area of application is
particularly apt since, in microfinance, the need for fit with local needs and contingencies
can be especially pressing. Being typically underfunded and understaffed and employed in
widely varying conditions, microfinance programs either fit well into the particular com-
munity or soon disappear. The ability to tailor programs to the particular needs of the target
community is said to be one of the main factors for success of microfinance programs
(Wright 2000; Aghion and Morduch 2005). It has, in fact, become a central tenet in the
literature on designing institutions under complexity (e.g., see Lejano 2008). And the
means by which programs are so tailored are not exhausted by the material aspects of
policy but include cognitive elements like behavioral incentives the way target populations
are socially constructed (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Our research agenda aspires to what
Mandell and Steelman (2003), writing about organizational networks, described as the
need to establish a lingua franca for the study of innovation.
Theory of institutional contextualism: Conceptualizing fit
Policy scholars had, even in the early literature, already recognized that non-static,
process-dependent nature of policy design. As Pressman and Wildavsky wrote: ‘‘Fixed
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prescriptions—‘knowing that’—give way to ‘knowing how’…Implementation is evolu-
tion’’ (1979, p. 176). The literature has decidedly weighed in on the inadequacy of a fixed
stage model of the policymaking process (Sabatier 2007). Whether it is referred to as
policy redesign (Bobrow and Dryzek 1987; May 1992), transposition (Sewell 1992), or
adaptation (Ingram and Schneider 1990), the fact is that implementers exercise some
degree of agency in deciding whether to copy an existing policy design or modify it in
contextually relevant ways.
This is perhaps most clearly evident in the literature on policy transfer. As Rose stated,
purely mimetic copying from one context to another is most often suboptimal and infea-
sible (2005). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) posit modes of transfer that involve other than
pure copying—i.e., emulation, which is borrowing general ideas but not specific details,
and combination, which involves mixtures of different policies. This is similar to Rose’s
notion of hybridization, which involves evolution of a modified policy design (1991).
We build upon this already established notion of policy/program evolution. To the
degree that the policy literature has not focused on it in much detail, this article attempts to
more richly describe how policies evolve beyond an initial template, and we identify basic
mechanisms involved in this process. We build on a number of concepts found in the
policy and organizational literatures (as discussed below), carefully describe mechanisms
for policy fit, and illustrate how this focus on fit helps us more deeply understand complex
programs like microfinance.
Organizational theorists have described two basic ways that institutional ideas evolve in
a place—either by a legitimation-driven process of diffusion from one context to another
(Powell and Dimaggio 1991) or by shaping within an existing context (Hannan and
Freeman 1977). In truth, these processes occur hand-in-hand, and our work studies how
policy designs, imported (or diffused) into a particular context, are then modified and
adapted to fit that context. The policy design literature sometimes refers to these processes
as calibration (Howlett 2009).
Let us clarify some of the concepts we use, beginning with what we mean by
contextualism. In their book, Rediscovering Institutions, March and Olsen (1989, p. 3)
described a kind of contextualism that subordinated political institutions to the social
structures, like class stratification, found in a place. To them, contextualism referred to
institutions being epiphenomenal to context—e.g., bureaucratic processes simply reflecting
larger social patterns, such as the presence of a ruling elite. We treat institutions as the
primary phenomenon, and for us, contextualism means understanding institutions to be
continually constructed through the interaction of the originating blueprint with the socio-
physical context. Institutions are not completely determined by context but do exist in a
dynamic relationship with it.
Often, theorists mean context to be the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell
1983), as in a sector of economic activity like finance. In this article, context literally
means place and community—the village where a project is conducted, its residents, its
streets and alleys, all embedded in a network of relations that make up the institution. We
use the term, text, to refer to the formal institutional narrative or blueprint that governs the
nature, purpose, and design of a program or policy (Lejano 2006). Our model of institu-
tional fit posits the institution as a phenomenon constituted by the ongoing dialectic
between text and context, as depicted in Fig. 1. The institution is assembled by textual and
contextual elements (or ‘‘constitua’’) coming together. Semiotically, the meaning of an
institution can be understand as the universal (‘‘text’’) and particular (‘‘context’’) inter-
acting in hermeneutic fashion.
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There are two processes depicted in Fig. 1. First, the upper half of the system depicts
how institutions are socially constructed by policy actors that can be external to the locale
of implementation. We refer to the generic design of the institution as text, and there exists
a constitutive relationship between text and institution. The lower half of the system, on the
other hand, focuses not on the initial or generic design of the institution but how it then
begins to evolve into a better fit with the locale, which we refer to as context. That is, there
exists an ecological relationship between institution and context, where ‘ecological’ simply
means that the object of study does not exist autonomously by itself, but in and through
relationship with its surroundings. Out of this dialectic between text and context emerges
the institution. Figure 1 can be understood as a type of hermeneutic, as defined by Gad-
amer (1960) and Ricoeur (1991), which is a back-and-forth exchange between text and
context, out of which emerges meaning.
Figure 1 is similar in spirit to Richard Scott’s notion of top-down and bottom-up
organizational processes simultaneously at work (Scott 1995). But his model corresponds
to the upper half of Fig. 1, as lower-level actors are both acted on and act upon normative
structures above (e.g., governance structures interacting with organizations), emphasizing
the agency of policy actors as something active against the structuring nature of norms and
standards. But not discussed in his dialectic model of structure and agency is the explicit
structuring action of social and physical context (i.e., structuration ‘‘from below’’ these
primary agents), on which we focus. In the model herein, the differentiating nature of the
local assumes the central role.
Also relevant are what Matland noted as the top-down and bottom-up schools in the
implementation literature (Matland 1995; Sabatier 2008). In this case, the effectiveness of
an institution is determined either at the level of policy designers (as in Pressman and
Wildavsky 1979; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989) or,
locally, at the level of implementation (as in Weatherley and Lipsky 1977; Berman 1980;
Hull and Hjern 1987). Our preference is to study these as occurring concurrently—i.e.,
policy designs may be brought or may diffuse, already complete, to a locale for imple-
mentation, but may then be reworked and redesigned at that locale.
We also draw an understanding of contextuality and fit from contingency theory. The
central premise, which Lawrence and Lorsche state as ‘‘how organizations must vary if
Fig. 1 Representation of
institutional coherence
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they are to cope effectively with different environmental circumstances’’ (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967), underscores the main focus of contingency research, which is making
predictable the highly contingent and contextual process of institutional innovation that
necessarily occurs. It is understandable, then, that this literature’s most important contri-
butions involve delineating general organizational characteristics that respond to charac-
teristics in the organizational environment—e.g., Donaldson’s key outcome variables of
specialization, formalization, structural differentiation, and decentralization (Donaldson
2001). Our interest, however, is in on a more micro-level, dealing with those particularities
introduced at the local level that are not generalizable or comparable on an industry-wide
level.
This article will elaborate on the different mechanisms that govern institutional fit.
Figure 2 will be used as a schematic guide, the objective being, by the end of the article, to
fill in each section of the table with a list of operative mechanisms. The upper half of Fig. 1
is shaded because, as explained below, this aspect is already well covered in the literature
and need only be briefly mentioned in this article. Let us now describe and classify the
operative mechanisms behind institutional fit.
Upper half: constructive mechanisms
The upper half of Fig. 1 depicts institutions as socially constructed, externally crafted, and
imposed upon a latent field. Construction involves processes of norm diffusion, sharing of
routines, and alignment of cognitive and normative frames. These processes, which are
well covered in the literature, result in institutional isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio
1991). Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio described three mechanisms (coercion, nor-
malization, and mimesis) that mold institutions into pre-determined forms regarded as
legitimate in their institutional field. For example, in the world of microfinance, the much
acclaimed Grameen bank became the template for microfinance in every corner of the
developing world. Quinones Jr. and Seibel (2000) describe how the Grameen model was
Fig. 2 Schematic of institutional
mechanisms
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replicated in the Philippines. Mimesis, in the cases they described, involved not just
emulating the form of the program but its repertoire of practices (e.g., group loans,
pledges). The template or normative frame of a program will be referred to as, simply,
‘‘text’’, reflecting the narrative nature of norm-setting models. The degree to which these
narratives transform institutional landscapes is then a function of the efficiency of norm
diffusion (Strang and Soul 1998).
This article does not focus much on the upper half of Fig. 1, because these mechanisms
have been adequately described by the afore-mentioned and other authors. The concern is,
rather, on the lower half, which involves ecological-contextual mechanisms for institu-
tional fit. This also responds to a gap in the literature (as pointed out by Howlett and
Rayner 2008) that it is often simply assumed that some policy idea or design is diffused in
toto—rather, if one looks closely at ‘‘what’’ is being diffused, one may find that some
elements (e.g., policy goals) simply diffuse, while others (e.g., specific policy instruments)
undergo translation. As Rose wrote: ‘‘In the real world, we would never expect a pro-
gramme to transfer from one government to another without history, culture and institu-
tions being taken into account’’ (1991, p. 21) or, in Westley’s words ‘‘emulation produces
innovation’’ (1987, p. 224). The role of context in determining innovation is clearly an
important yet understudied phenomenon. This, we discuss next.
Lower half: ecological mechanisms
In this section, we describe institutions as ecological phenomena and study mechanisms
that allow a program to fit into its particular context. In our model, institutions grow out of
a place and, to some extent, will exhibit features that belong to it. This ecological effect
comes about through at least two processes. First, for an institution to be an institution, it
must maintain itself and, for this to happen, institution and environment (i.e., context) must
somehow be compatible. Secondly, programs are often carried out under resource-scarce
conditions, and there may not be enough budgetary and other resources to build an
institution de novo. For this reason, program planners may draw from the resources of a
particular place and craft programs based on local opportunities and constraints—let us call
this improvisation. For these two reasons—that of coherence and improvisation, one
should expect enduring institutions to reflect some characteristics that are unique to their
particular context. In this sense, one might expect programs to eventually exhibit poly-
morphism or differentiation.
Michael Hannan and John Freeman described an ecological model wherein institutions
are shaped, formally and materially, by their immediate organizational context (Hannan
and Freeman 1977; also Freeman and Audia 2006). In their work, institutions are under-
stood as having evolved into some equilibrium condition with their institutional sur-
roundings. One should find, mirrored in elements or aspects of an institution, determining
influences from this context. An example of this phenomenon is Richard Scott’s and John
Meyer’s finding that organizations in more complex, fragmented environments would
develop more complex and elaborate administrative structures (Scott and Meyer 1983).
This is related to the original notion of imprinting (Stinchcombe 1965) or the reflection of
environmental characteristics that helped shaped an institution at its founding.
Unlike isomorphism, mechanisms of fit that produce polymorphism have not been as
closely examined in the recent literature. Our research agenda revolves around these
mechanisms of fit. It goes beyond the constructionist idea of fit as social legitimacy (Scott
2001), but also beyond the simple ecological notion of homeostasis or equilibrium in a
balanced exchange of material across interfaces (Odum 1960). Fit is not only legitimacy,
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which occurs on the symbolic plane, but also depends on the material—i.e., the constant
generation and employment of resources. On the other hand, fit is not simply homeostasis,
because human institutions exist in a dynamic process of change, conflict, and resolution.
They might just as easily exist in a perpetual state of disequilibrium. Institutional coherence
is not only a materialist notion, and there is no strictly determinative relationship between
environment and institution. Rather, fit is an outcome of multiple processes: material
exchange, political action, and influences by the local culture. Concepts from organizational
theory are useful in describing mechanisms that make up the lower half of Fig. 1.
Specification and adaptation
One possible mechanism for fitting a program to the local context together is the phe-
nomenon that Granovetter (1985) termed embedding. That is, the institution is emplaced
into a situation as originally constructed. The universal template remains. However, at a
further level of explication, the institution takes on particular forms that pertain to their
local context. In this case, the embedding relationship between text and context is like
translating a universal model into particular form. This mode of fit will be referred to as
specification. The other possibility is, while the template remains as designed, elements of
the surrounding context adjust to fit to it—let us refer to this mode of fitting as adaptation.
The ecological notion of fit as niche is particularly apt. First of all, in ecological terms, the
program takes up a physical niche—e.g., its program office takes up space, its workforce
takes up labor, its expenditures generate a multiplier effect through the local economy, etc.
But perhaps most important is the niche it occupies in the political economy of everyday
life among program recipients.
Improvisation
The program evolves as design refinements are made to adapt it more closely to local
conditions—e.g., the microfinance program adds a savings component in response to local
needs. Let us refer to this adaptive process as improvisation. In the case of microfinance,
the program adapts as it begins to occupy an important place in household and community
strategies for survival. This is not simply translation of already existing elements to locally
relevant forms, but the addition, removal, or substantial redesign of elements such that a
qualitatively new program results. There are refined changes to the original program
template, whether by addition, modification, or substitution.
Bricolage
Another possibility is for text and context to combine in a kind of bricolage (Levi-Strauss
1966; Derrida 1978). Douglas describes bricolage as fragments of pre-existing institutional
principles assembled together to form new institutions (Douglas 1986). Here, the work is
not that of the engineer engaged in construction but that of the bricoleur engaged in
combination. Weick, using jazz as a metaphor, described a similar process within orga-
nizations, where policy actors create on the spot, combining elements, routines, and
designs at hand in new ways (Weick 1988). Program proponents may combine elements of
the institutional design with other various elements and institutional models found in place
(e.g., local practices and institutions). What one should find are hybrid program designs,
and institutional diversity results from the different ways that program actors improvise
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their institutions. This process of mixing and matching of elements will be referred to as
bricolage. Here, parts of different institutional blueprints may be mixed and matched into
something altogether unique.
What logics govern the above processes? March and Olsen described the idea of fit as a
logic of appropriateness (1989; p. 23). That is, a program or organization is designed such
that it conforms to prevailing norms, standards, customs, and styles. As they describe it, the
logic of appropriateness most immediately involves similitude, but we extend the idea to
include borrowing material and cognitive resources from the context. This can occur as a
matter of necessity—e.g., consider programs that are strapped for resources. A good
example is that of New Orleans, where some elements of the health system, like Mercy
Hospital, were never replaced after Hurricane Katrina. In their stead, some local health
professionals took to running health clinics from their own homes (http://www.
helpholycross.org/2007/08/nursing-the-low.html accessed October 8, 2009). Let us now
turn to the case study to observe ecological fit in everyday institutional life.
Case study analysis
To illustrate our theory, we examine institutional fit in the area of microfinance, a field
characterized by incorporation into countless community settings worldwide and variation
in design. Were it not for active processes of fit, microfinance would not have been able to
challenge the dominance of traditional financial institutions. The case study examines
microfinance institutions in Tamil Nadu, Southern India, a site of almost explosive growth
in microfinance institutions (MFIs) and, undoubtedly, a site of great institutional innova-
tion. We trace the growth of MFIs in India using archival information and supplement this
with field interviews with microfinance workers and program recipients in Tamil Nadu,
India.
We divide the case study analysis into three sections, each studying institutional fit at
progressively more refined scales of analysis. At each level, we conduct our analysis by
looking for the processes of institutional fit that we outlined earlier.
Section I is a macro-level look at how two main microfinance models, the Microfinance
Institution (MFI) Model and the Self-Help Group Bank Linkage Programme (SBLP),
evolved in India, and the choices made, at the broad institutional level, about what type of
model best served the poor.
Section II is an intermediate or meso-level look at changes in program design, as the
models were modified to fit both the specific needs of particular communities and the
nature of actors implementing the programs.
Section III is a micro-level look at how households took the various models of micro-
finance and fitted them, in unique ways, to their individual situations. For this, we use
primary data based on field interviews of MFI and SBLP members.
Macro-level fit: institutional choice
On the most general level, the first question that policy actors in India had to answer was:
what institutional model for providing financial services might suit the needs of the poor?
At this macro-level of analysis, fit mainly involves choosing which models for micro
financing to employ in India. We describe below the process of evolution of the micro-
finance models to understand the context in which these models were initiated.
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The MFI model was a diffusion of the NGO-centered Grameen Bank model from
Bangladesh to the Indian context. However, it was not simply diffusion of the model in
toto. Rather, the Grameen model underwent processes of specification, as features of it
took on local form. The design remained the same, but was simply translated to the local
context. The second, parallel solution was the state-initiated SBLP which used the existing
infrastructure of state-owned financial institutions to deliver financial services to the poor
by using NGOs as boundary agents. Earlier, even though the state-run financial institutions
had been specifically mandated to serve low-income groups, it was found that in practice
they were not doing so. To address this issue, a model was evolved that would enable these
institutions to better reach out to the poor. This is a macro-level type of bricolage, as two
distinct programs were combined and allowed to co-exist as local actors saw fit. We
discuss these models below.
Translating the Grameen Bank model to the Indian context
The first model, MFI, is based on the Grameen Bank’s group-lending model—a diffusion
of an ‘‘imported’’ model into the local scene. Though the main features of the Grameen
Bank model are adopted by its replicators the world over, there is a need for translation into
the local institutional terms. This is a good example of how the embedding process leads to
rich specification. As pointed out by David Gibbons, who was actively associated with
Grameen programs in Malaysia and India, Grameen replications in other countries nec-
essarily discover ‘‘functional equivalents for essential elements that cannot simply be
copied because of cultural, economic or political barriers in the new context. This is the
most creative and exciting part of the whole process’’ (Gibbons 1999). Thus, while the
Grameen Bank MFI template remained, local programs necessarily took on local forms
that accorded with local practices and institutions—i.e., specification. Good examples of
this were found in Cashpor Financial and Technical Services Private Limited (CFTS), one
of the earliest Grameen Bank replicators in India and Grama Vidiyal Microfinance Limited
(GVMFL), whose field officers we interviewed.
Here are a few concrete examples of this active specification process:
1. In the Bangladesh-based Grameen Bank, initial loan amounts and repayment schemes
were based on the activity of paddy husking, with its low capital requirements (around
100 US dollars). In Mirzapur, India, where paddy husking was not done, CFTS found
that the closest livelihood generating activity of choice being purchase of a milch
animal. And, so, loan amounts of double the original amount were considered.
2. Instead of identifying the poor as those whose total household assets were valued at
less than one acre of land, as was done in Bangladesh, CFTS used a housing index to
identify the poor. This was because, when CFTS started operating in Mirzapur, India,
in 1996, it was viewed with suspicion by the residents, who were hesitant to share
information about the land and assets they owned.
3. GVMFL developed the practice of having the borrower’s husband, in the case of
married borrowers, appear personally at the MFI branch and sign the loan documents
along with his wife. The branch manager of the Nanillam Branch of GVMFL
highlighted that this practice was particularly useful as a screening mechanism to
gauge the level of understanding between the husband and wife, as past experience in
his area indicated that households with domestic tensions are likely defaulters.
4. Adjustments are particularly obvious in the written program material. Take, for
example, the translation of the Grameen Bank pledge to the Indian context. The
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pledges used by the Grameen Bank and Grama Vidiyal Microfinance Private Limited
(GVMFL), an Indian MFI patterned after the Grameen Bank model, are shown in
Table 1. This represents a kind of specification that primarily involves translation of
the basic norm to local terms. Languages, as found in vehicles like pledges, differ
because they emerge from specific groups processes. The sixteen points in the
Bangladeshi pledge were formulated based on feedback obtained from Grameen Bank
members. When it came time for the Indian MFIs to establish their own routines, they
chose to keep their pledges short. The reasoning was that, as pledges are required to be
repeated at every meeting, a shorter pledge saves time for borrowers and MFI staff.
5. Translation involves modifying practices to be more compatible with local social
norms. In Grameen Bank, Bangladesh, MFI members are required to salute the
Grameen Bank field officer at the meeting. This symbolic gesture is used to emphasize
the discipline required from the MFI borrower. This practice was not adopted by MFIs
in India, however, as it would likely have been viewed as undemocratic in that
country’s political culture (Harper 2002).
SBLP: combining existing institutional models
Policy actors also chose a second model, the SBLP (Self-Help Group Bank Linkage
Program), which evolved as a parallel institution, distinct from the MFI. The creation of
this model is itself an example of bricolage as it involved bringing together different
institutions, each able to provide only one part of the solution. India’s state-owned banks
had branches in rural areas but were still inaccessible to low-income groups. This is due to
their insistence that customers visit their branches at specific hours of the day. Drawing on
field experiments conducted by Asia Pacific Rural and Agricultural Association (APRA-
CA) and International Labour Organization (ILO), NABARD (the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development) decided to involve non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to bring together the formal banking structure and the rural poor. We see therefore
that both the MFI model and the SBLP are examples of how sharing of institutional models
across countries has played an important role in developing microfinance in India. These
NGOs were already involved in various initiatives involving community mobilization and
training and, so, were well-placed to lead a community-based banking initiative. NABARD
designed training programs for low-income women on saving and managing loans. The
goal was to build these groups’ capacity to access bank funds, eventually managing their
own finances without NGO help (NABARD 1991). This women-centered, self-help model
was subsequently replicated throughout the country.
Bricolage is the process by which institutions are pieced together to fit the needs of a
situation. While SBLP tended to concentrate in those low-income neighborhoods where bank
branches were already located, private sector MFIs tended to fill in the spatial gaps, earlier
on. However, as the years passed, the great demand for microfinance led to MFIs and SBLPs
spilling over into common areas. MFIs and SBLPs started serving small areas within a town,
each holding meetings wherever there were enough interested low-income women who lived
within walking distance. For example, as recounted to us by the branch manager of the
GVMFL MFI program in Tiruvarur district in Tamil Nadu, their branch begun doing busi-
ness in January 2009 and, by July 2009, had 1,350 borrowers. Bank centers were established
wherever there was a group of twenty potential members who lived on the same or adjacent
street. GVMFL’s improvised rule that members come from no farther than the next street was
related to their desire to maintain regular attendance at the weekly meetings.
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At a macro-scale of analysis, the MFI and SBLP models soon had overlapping juris-
dictions. We expected to see a fair amount of competition between the two models in
Tamil Nadu. Surprisingly, the GVMFL field officers we interviewed did not consider the
SBLP to be a competitor. They mentioned that most women decided to also join the SBLP
in order to participate in community actions and avail of Government benefits and sub-
sidies. At times, there were subsidies provided on loans. As this was beneficial to the
members, the field officers did not discourage this practice. The field officers saw that the
MFI and the SBLP served different needs and different borrowers. This type of bricolage
Table 1 Pledges of Grameen Bank and Grama Vidiyal Microfinance Private Limited
Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) Grama Vidivalmkro Finance Private Limited
(India)
1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of
Grameen Bark: Discipline, Unity, Courage, and Hard
Work - in all walks of our lives
1. Grama Vidiyal is our organization. We will
strive constantly to grow our organization
2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families 2 We will lead our organization by acting as the
owners, managers and workers
3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair
our houses and work toward constructing new houses at
the earliest
3. We will deposit our savings and repay our
loans every week without fail
4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall
eat plenty of them and sell the surplus
4. We will utilize our loans in a proper manner
5. We shall plant as many seedlings as possible 5. We will strive to increase our income and
progress our family
6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall
minimize our expenditures. We shall look after our
health
6. We will co operate with group members and
organization members
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that they can
earn enough to pay for their education
7. We will implement social improvement
schemes in a proper manner
8. We shall always keep our children and the
environment clean
8. Thriftiness protects the family, savings
protects the nation
9. We shall build and use pit latrines 9. To get a loan is a human right. To repay it
without fail is our duty
10. We shall drink water from tube wells. If it is not
available we shall boil water or use alum
11. We shall not take dowry at our son’s weddings.
Neither shall we give any dowry at our daughter’s
wedding. We shall keep our center free from the curse
of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage
12. We shall not inflict any injustice on any one, neither
shall we allow anyone to do so
13. We shall collectively undertake bigger investments
for higher incomes
14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If any
one is in difficulty, we shall all help him or her
15. If we come to know of any breech of discipline in any
center we shall all go there and help restore discipline
I6. We shall take part in all social activities collectively
Source: Grameen Bank pledge from www.grameen.com and GVMFL pledge, transcribed, and translated
into English by one of the co-authors during field visit
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follows the same logic of fitting each piece in (whether MFI or SBLP) wherever the need
for this particular service is greatest.
Some basic differences between the SBLP and Grameen models are shown in Table 2.
Meso-level fit: varying program design
Over time, it was observed that, through a process of improvisation, policy actors modified
the original design to better match local needs and practices. Unlike simple embedding and
specification, improvisation modifies the essential template of the model.
Changing forms of MFIs
Over time, MFIs found that the need for loans by low-income groups were far in excess of
the amount social entrepreneurs could raise personally and from banks. In order to access
more funding and meet the needs of more individuals, many MFIs transformed their legal
identity from those usually adopted by not-for-profits (such as trusts and societies) to more
commercially oriented forms such as ‘‘non-banking finance companies’’. Sriram (2010)
examined some of these transformations, which in some cases diluted the social objectives
of some of the large MFIs in the country. The result of these developments was that there
was a wide variety of actors all called ‘‘MFIs’’.
Development of unique characteristics of the SBLP
In the case of the SBLP, NABARD’s emphasis was on financial services. NABARD’s
original circular was entitled ‘‘Improving access of rural poor to banking’’ (NABARD
1991). NGOs were viewed initially as merely conduits between banks and the people.
However, the involvement of NGOs in the SBLP brought pressures to make the program
Table 2 Comparing SBLP and MFI (Grameen) models
SBLP MFI/Grameen
Loan advanced by commercial bank Loan advanced by MFI
Group members trained to do record keeping and
bank transactions
MFI staff do record keeping and bank transactions
Loans are given to SHGs which on lend to members Loans are given to members individually though on
a joint liability basis
Smaller loans, lower interest rates Larger loans, higher interest rates
Savings for 6–12 months needs to precede borrowing Loans are given without any prior savings period.
In fact savings cannot be collected by MFIs due
to regulatory reasons
Delivery of microcredit viewed by some NGOs as
secondary to goals of female empowerment and
social transformation
Microcredit is the main focus
On an ad hoc basis, Government subsidies are given
to SHGs by way of grants equivalent to a part of the
loan
There is no subsidy element in MFIs
Broader social agenda, skills training, savings
program
Uniformity of service, professional recordkeeping
practices
Poor quality control across groups Lacks savings programs
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evolve beyond simply providing financial services. We describe a few concrete examples
of this:
1. The NGOs brought to the program not just material resources such as trained workers
but also their ethical framework, which emphasized empowerment and other social
issues. In fact, some NGOs view delivery of microcredit as only secondary goal to the
social aspects. For instance MYRADA, the NGO, which was closely involved in the
early development of the SBLP, mentions on its web site that its objective is ‘‘to help
the poor help themselves… by forming SHGs (Self-Help Groups) and through
partnerships with other organizations’’. At another point, MYRADA mentions that it
‘‘has always been clear that it should not compromise its development role with the
role of a financier’’ (www.myrada.org).
2. Because of the NGOs’ focus on women’s empowerment, capacity development
became a central focus of the SBLP. This has been done through both formal training
as well as informal interactions with NGO workers during group meetings. Often NGO
workers advise the group on the proper conduct of group meetings, group decision
making, and conflict resolution. The SHG becomes a training ground for women to
take on more public roles and participate more actively in political processes. A study
by EDA-APMAS (2006) of 214 SHGs in 108 villages in four states of India found that
one in four SHGs had a woman member that ran for political office.
3. The SHGs also provide an umbrella group for mobilizing collective action in the
village. EDA-APMAS (2006) found that 30 % of the SHGs in the sample were
involved in specific community actions. The community actions included efforts to
improve community services (such as water supply, education, roads, health care, and
veterinary care), stop alcohol sale, contribute finance and labor for new infrastructure
projects, protect natural resources, and mobilize giving to charity.
4. The most important innovation of the SBLP was the development of SHG federations.
These federations were formed by SHGs in a region coming together to facilitate
exchange of ideas and derive greater capacity for collective action. SHG federations
are an important example of how institutional models are shared by poor
constituencies. These federations are formed at various levels: village, sub-district,
and district. This structure results in a multiplier effect with regard to sharing of
information and innovations from one SHG in a village to SHGs throughout the
district. Their capacity for coordinated collective action is also considerable. The
outreach of SHG federations has been used in health information campaigns, disaster
relief activities, and women’s rights advocacy. They have been even used to
implement Government programs such as mid-day meal schemes in Government
schools. Other SHG federations used their combined power to forge market linkages
for their members by collective marketing or contracting with large buyers of products
such as milk commonly sold by members. Essentially, these SGH federations became
learning-and-action communities.
Once formed, SHG federations adopt objectives based on their member’s needs. More
than half of the 94,000 SHG federations have adopted financial objectives such as bor-
rowing in bulk from banks and then on-lending to SHGs (Srinivasan 2009). In such cases,
the SHG federation virtually acts like an MFI. SHG federations having non-financial
objectives show a wide variety of objectives such as capacity development of member
SHGs (e.g., providing training in book-keeping and auditing) and improvement of liveli-
hood of members (e.g., collective marketing of market products such as milk).
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An interesting example of an SHG federation that successfully innovated a social
welfare scheme is that of Kadamalai Federation in Theni District of Tamil Nadu. This
federation, promoted by Dhan Foundation, has evolved a mutual health insurance program,
fully owned and managed by the community. The model is based on the pooling of risk
among SHG members and is backed up by reinsurance. Due to inadequate health care
facilities in the area, the scheme has its own hospital for primary health care and has tied
up with other hospitals for secondary health care. http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/RessShow
Ressource.do?ressourceId=6191
5. The characteristics of SHGs are influenced by the particular NGO involved during its
inception. Some NGOs take special initiatives to give the SHGs a sense of identity and
unity. For instance, Bullock Cart Workers Development Association (BWDA), an
NGO based in Tamil Nadu, provides uniforms to SHG members at reasonable prices
which the members can wear during community activities. We interviewed S., an SHG
member of BWDA, about this practice and she said ‘‘When we all wear our ‘uniform’
saris which BWDA has provided us at a reasonable cost, we have a strange sense of
power. Everyone even on the street looks at us with respect.’’
6. NGOs also often developed initiatives that meet local needs unrelated to financial
services. BWDA for instance noticed that their SHG members often heavily draw
down their carefully built-up savings to buy items for festivals, as typically the prices
of these goods go up at this time. It therefore initiated a scheme of itself buying these
goods in bulk in advance of the festival and later distributing it at cost to SHG
members. In the words of S., SHG member: ‘‘During every festival, BWDA provides
the items required by us at reasonable prices. We find their care touching, almost like
what a woman would expect from her parental home’’.
Both the SBLP and the MFI models have, over a period of time, developed their own
strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the SBLP include its wider social agenda, the
training provided to group members, and its emphasis on savings. Its primary weakness is
that as groups manage themselves after a point, there is wide variation in quality observed
between groups (EDA-APMAS 2006).
Over time, new types of bricolage resulted in various hybrid organizational designs.
Some NGOs started their own MFI programs by raising funds from Government agencies
and financial institutions. While their programs continue to use the broad SBLP frame-
work, instead of SHGs approaching banks for the loans, the loans were given by the NGOs
themselves. However, the most interesting type of bricolage occurred at the local,
household level as will be described in ‘‘Micro-level fit: household appropriation’’.
Micro-level fit: household appropriation
Household strategies
The third level or scale at which we found processes of fit involved the ways households
appropriated or fitted in the microfinance programs into their own needs and routines, and
vice versa. At this level, program officers have already made institutional and program
design choices, and the only question is how the user takes advantage of the programs. The
choices at this stage do not lie with the program managers but the individuals and
household recipients.
For this section, we conducted interviews with twenty-three female members (i.e., loan
recipients) of the GVMFL. Mainly, we were interested in how the members fit the program
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into their daily round and needs of their households. We recruited women with only a
minimal set of criteria, namely that they were active recipients and had been so for at least
3 years. The 3-year period is a common threshold employed in the literature to indicate
microfinance members who had enough experience with the programs to be employing the
loans effectively. The interviews used, as a framework, only a basic set of guide questions
that the interviewer sometimes referred to, but these were essentially semi-structured and,
in part, open-ended. The interviews were conducted in Tamil, and the interviewer recorded
responses on paper during the interview. We also supplemented these with selected
interviews with field officers of the GVMFL as a way to verify the insights from our
conversations with the members.
It is interesting to consider that twelve of the twenty-three interviewees had, contrary to
program practice, joined both MFI and SBLP programs. In response to questions on which
model was superior, it was surprising to find that all these women viewed each model as
serving different purposes. So, contrary to our expectations with regard to a competition
between the two models, we found out that borrowers often took advantage of both
programs because they made use of each type of program to meet different purposes. For
example, 34-year-old Pr. who being a graduate was the most highly educated of our
interviewees had this kind of dual membership. A salesperson in the local music shop, she
has been an MFI member for 3 years and had availed loans to buy goats which she bred
and later sold for a profit. She thought it important last year to also take a membership in an
SHG due to the opportunities for taking up leadership roles. She was the ‘‘Deputy Leader’’
of her SHG and she was happy that she was learning new things such as keeping basic
accounts. She was also looking forward to involving herself in community actions. C., a
31-year-old tailor, was a member in both an MFI and an SHG. She finds that both programs
have their uses. She depends on the MFI for regular access to finance, whereas she is part
of the SHG so that she is aware of community initiatives in the village and is in a position
to take advantage of those that she finds useful.
The other women interviewed echoed similar sentiments. They viewed the two pro-
grams as being qualitatively different and used them in complementary fashion. While
members used MFIs for access to resources, they turned to the SBLP not only for funds but
for access to skills, experience in deciding on group priorities, developing tactical skills in
pressing their agenda, and access to information on Government initiatives. The fact that
the groups were linked to public sector banks offered them a distinct and respectable
identity, giving them a sense of empowerment. The membership in the MFI on the other
hand was seen as the key to a reliable and predictable source of funding. The women
valued this membership as well and were dependent on it for working capital as well as to
meet lump sum expenses. This process of mixing of the two distinct programs and
matching with the unique needs of each household is bricolage. As regards the loans
availed by the members form MFIs and SHGs, these were fitted in according to household
needs at the time the loan was disbursed.
Table 3 provides the case study of P., a member of an MFI and an SHG, diagramming
financial cash flows, which reveals how each loan was used.
In Table 3, we see the active process of bricolage as a fitting of multiple sources of
loans into the household budget according to suitability, the latter determined in this case
by criteria of loan amount and timing. In this case, the bricoleur keeps the raw materials
separate and fits them wherever they are most useful. Contrary to the assumptions of the
loan programs, members did not select one microfinance program or another—rather, they
combined them in different ways, according to their individual characteristics.
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Adaptation is evident—e.g., physically fitting the womens’ daily routines to the pro-
grams. This is important, as our interviews with program staff indicates that one of the
primary reasons for people dropping out of the programs is inability to attend meetings. In
Table 3 Household profile
P., 27 years old, runs a tea shop along with her husband in Sembattur, a village in Pudukkottai district,
Tamil Nadu, with a population of around 2,500. She lives with her husband and four children aged 11,
8, 5, and 2 years in a rented house near the shop. As her shop is on the main road and is one out of just
three similar ones in the village, there is a stream of regular customers who patronize it. Another set of
customers comprise drivers of vehicles passing through the village. Last year, the earnings from the tea
shop fell substantially for a couple of months as due to repair on the road adjoining it, which reduced
street and pedestrian traffic considerably. To supplement income, at times ‘‘P’’ and her husband lease
out land for some agriculture activity, which, at the moment, is a break-even proposition
P. has been a member of a micro finance institution, Grama Vidiyal Micro Finance Limited (GVMFL) a
micro finance institution which provides micro credit. She used her first loan of Rs. 5,000 to buy an
electric grinder for the tea shop and her second loan of Rs. 7,000 to buy utensils and other things for the
shop. This year she has got a loan of Rs. 8,000. She is also simultaneously, a member of a self-help
group (SHG) for the last two years and this year she got a loan of Rs. 1,500 from there as well. The
SHG also obtained a Government subsidy to the extent of Rs. 500 per member toward repayment of the
loan
As shown in the chart, loans are fitted into the budget according to current household needs and
depending on the value of the loan and the time of disbursement. This year, the MFI loan was of the
right amount to purchase a gift for a relative on a special occasion. The SBLP loan was used for
agriculture, as it happened that it was disbursed at the time when inputs for farming were to be
purchased. Asked if she prefers the MFI or the SBLP, ‘‘P’’ smiles and says ‘‘they are both good, both of
them help us’’
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a sense, these women seemed to have fit both models into their schedules and budgets, so
as to leverage the strengths of each model in an overall strategy. The household is an
important site for bricolage.
Double-talk
The interviews with the women revealed yet another mode of local fit, which we did not
expect. As we see in Table 3, the way the households utilized both sources of microfi-
nancing ran counter to the formal program objectives as different microfinance programs
were mixed and matched. In other cases, there were instances of loans being availed by
women but being utilized for businesses run by their husbands. While the MFI and the
SBLP target loans to women in order to encourage them to have their own source of
income, some members used the loans to fund enterprises run entirely by their husbands.
Surprisingly, they viewed the enterprises as their own, in keeping with Indian ethos and
culture. They viewed it merely as an allocation of responsibilities among household
members with regard to running the microenterprise and attending weekly microfinance
group meetings, based on practical considerations (e.g., men often cannot attend these
meetings as they leave for work early, while women cannot engage themselves in the
enterprise due to other household responsibilities). They did not view it as contrary to MFI
or SHG program objectives. In both examples above, we find local strategies that con-
tradict the formal parameters of the microcredit programs.
How do both co-exist, meaning local narratives and the broader, formal narratives of the
program? Simply, as two different narratives that do not encounter each other in a formal
sense and, so, avoid explicit conflict between formal program goals and local household
strategies. The women simply engage in double-talk, which is formally agreeing to overall
program objectives, while employing alternative strategies locally. This is akin to what
Argyris and Scho¨n describe as formal program theories and more licit, theories-in-place,
co-existing (Argyris and Scho¨n 1974), and what Goffman refers to as the simultaneous
existence of frontstage and backstage performance (Goffman 1959, 1990). Rather than
frontstage versus backstage, perhaps a more appropriate dualism is that of formal versus
informal. This is a form of institutional irony that we believe to be an important form of
institutional coherence.
We summarize the schema for institutional fit in Table 4. We caution the reader,
however, that such a list as found in the table is by no means exhaustive or definitive.
Rather, they are just the most distinct modes of action found when examining microfinance
in India close up.
Conclusions
We tried to illustrate how, by focusing closely upon how and why programs evolve over
time, we find distinct mechanisms of making fit at work. We believe that the exercise of
describing mechanisms of fit, in concept and in practice, to be an important research
agenda. In the case studied herein, we found that such a focus helped us see the logic
behind the sometimes bewildering array of variations in microfinance. These variations can
often be traced to deliberate actions by policy actors to make their program more sus-
tainable or more appealing to its particular set of beneficiaries, or to particular events and
contingencies that occur over the life of the program. The logic is not one of optimality, but
survival, appropriateness, and common sense—in other words, of fit.
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This type of research, which mainly involves observing policy actors as they improvise
new practices in the field (or interviewing them ex post), also provides insights into the
question of: how should a program be designed in the first place? Design, it seems, can
evolve over time through a network of actors and their myriad actions. But evolution is not
a pre-ordained process, and it requires actors that are empowered to act in a design capacity
in the field. This suggests a need to fashion programs that allow and perhaps encourage
such incremental modifications by local actors and street-level bureaucrats. Figure 1 is a
helpful conceptual aid, in this regard. As is made plain in the figure, a program or policy
can be understood as a coming together of text and context—i.e., of universal and par-
ticular elements. But the commingling of universal and particular can, in fact, be delib-
erately facilitated by program designers. Program designers can also provide guidance as to
how local actors might go about making modifications.
On the other hand, our work also implies the danger of purely ‘‘textualist’’ policy—i.e.,
designs that exist as autopoeitic systems that are insulated from the particulars of context.
These policies and programs can alienate local communities and actors, simply by their
sheer autonomy.
The policy and organizational literature has long recognized the improvisational, evo-
lutionary dimension of program design. However, a closer look at mechanisms of program
evolution, as we have taken here, seems to us a contribution to the literature on policy
transfer and program implementation as we encourage researchers to look further down the
road in the life of a program and closely watch how program design continues to evolve.
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